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Employment Law: Report a Crime, Lose Your Job: The
Oklahoma Supreme Court Reins in the Public Policy
Exception in Hayes v. Eateries, Inc.
L Introduction
Oklahoma courts still profess commitment to the common law doctrine that an
employment contract of infinite duration may be terminated at any time by either
party for any reason or no reason at all, commonly referred to as the employmentat-will doctrine.' However, this doctrine is not absolute. Inroads have been made
legislatively2 and judicially' into an employer's right to terminate an employee
arbitrarily. One such instance is when the employer terminates an employee in
contravention of public policy,4 commonly referred to as the public policy exception
to employment-at-will.
Under this exception, an employee who is discharged for performing an act
consistent with public policy or refusing to perform an act which contravenes public
policy is able to bring a tort claim against his former employer. Acts of
"whistleblowing," i.e., when an employee reports some wrongdoing by his or her
employer or a co-employee, have often been protected under the public policy
exception.
In Hayes v. Eateries, Inc.,6 the Oklahoma Supreme Court limited this
"whistleblowing" cause of action to only those instances in which an employee
reports crimes committed by his employer or a co-employee which directly affect
the public health, safety, or welfare and not merely the private and/or proprietary
interests of the employer.7 The Hayes court held that, as a matter of law, a viable
tort claim under the public policy exception to employment-at-will is not available
to an employee who is discharged for reporting embezzlement by a co-employee.8
Part II of this note offers a brief history of the public policy exception and, more
specifically, "whistleblower" cases prior to Hayes. Part III of this note examines the

1. See Burk v. Kniart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 26 (Okla. 1989).
2. See 85 OKLA. STAT. § 5 (Supp. 1996) (prohibiting employer from discharging an employee who
files a workers' compensation claim); 74 OKLA. STAT. § 840-2.5(A)(2) (Supp. 1996) (prohibiting state
employees from discharging any employee who reports a violation of state or federal law, mismanagement, or dangers to public health).
3. See generally, e.g., Blanton v. Housing Auth. of Norman, 794 P.2d 412 (Okla. 1990) (recognizing

an implied employment contract theory allowing only for just cause termination by employer); Burk v.
Kmart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989) (recognizing action in tort for discharge of employee in violation
of public policy).

4. See Burk, 770 P.2d at 28.
5. See Vannerson v. Board of Regents, 784 P.2d 1053, 1054 (Okla. 1989).
6. 905 P.2d 778 (Okla. 1995).
7. See id. at 786.
8. See id. at 780.
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reasoning of the Hayes court, followed in part IV by an analysis of that reasoning
in light of the underlying policy of Oklahoma's criminal statutes and the case law
in other jurisdictions concerning the public policy exception. Part V of this note
discusses the potential ramifications of Hayes on the future of the public policy
exception and employer/employee relationships. Finally, part VI of this note will
provide suggestions for legislative and judicial reform.
II. Public Policy Cause of Action Priorto Hayes
In the seminal case of Burk v. K-Mart Corp.,9 the Oklahoma Supreme Court
adopted a new cause of action in tort in those instances when an employee's
discharge "is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy as articulated by
constitutional, statutory or decisional law."" The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Oklahoma had certified for the Oklahoma Supreme Court
the question of whether an employment-at-will contract contained an implied
obligation of good faith and fair dealing. The Burk court answered the question in
the negative and adopted the public policy exception to employment-at-will. The
court stated "[a]n employer's termination of an at-will employee in contravention of
a clear mandate of public policy is a tortious breach of contractual obligations.""
The Burk court reasoned that adopting the public policy exception to
employment-at-will would balance the interests of society, the employer, and the
employee. 2 The Burk court relied on the reasoning employed by the Illinois Court
of Appeals in Palmateerv. InternationalHarvester Co: 3
With the rise of large corporations conducting specialized operations
and employing relatively immobile workers who often have no other
place to market their skills, recognition that the employer and employee
do not stand on equal footing is realistic. In addition, unchecked
employer power, like unchecked employee power, has been seen to
present a distinct threat to the public policy carefully considered and
adopted by society as a whole. As a result, it is now recognized that a
proper balance must be maintained among the employer's interest in
operating a business efficiently and profitably, the employee's interest
in earning a livelihood, and society's interest in seeing its public policies
carried out. 4
The Burk court was quick to note, however, that "the public policy exception
must be tightly circumscribed"'" and limited the cause of action to those instances
"where an employee is discharged for refusing to act in violation of an established

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

770 P.2d 24 (Oda. 1989).
Id. at 28.
Id.
See id.
421 N.E.2d 876 (III. App. Ct. 1981).
Burk, 770 P.2d at 28 (quoting Palmateer,421 N.E.2d at 878).
Id. at 29.
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and well-defined public policy or for performing an act consistent with a clear and
compelling public policy."'6 One such instance articulated by the court is when an
employee is discharged because the employer wants to avoid payment of benefits
already earned by the employee, such as commissions.'7
The court reasoned that allowing an actionable tort while tightly circumscribing
the instances when it could be invoked would provide a balance between the
competing interests of the employer, the employee, and society." The Burk court,
quoting Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet,9 stated:
Employee job security interests are safeguarded against employer
actions that undermine fundamental policy preferences. Employers
retain sufficient flexibility to make needed personnel decisions in order
to adapt to changing economic conditions. Society also benefits in a
number of ways. A more stable job market is achieved. Well-established public policies are advanced. Finally, the public is protected
against frivolous lawsuits since courts will be able to screen cases on
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim or for summary judgment
if the discharged employee cannot allege a clear expression of public
policy.'
Shortly after the Burk decision was announced, the Oklahoma Supreme Court was
faced with its first wrongful discharge case involving an employee who claimed he
was dismissed for reporting infractions of a co-employee. In Vannerson v. Board
of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,2' the plaintiff, an employee of the
University of Oklahoma, brought a claim for wrongful discharge. ' The claim arose
from two separate incidents. In the first instance, Vannerson witnessed a coemployee transfer two unopened boxes of floor tiles to a truck driver who was not
a University employee ' The second incident, which happened several months
after the first incident, involved a dispute between Vannerson and his supervisor
regarding departmental accounting discrepancies.
The Vannerson court held that if the University discharged Vannerson because
of the first incident, then Vannerson had a cognizable claim.' However, the events
of the second incident would not support a cause of action for wrongful discharge.' The court reasoned that an unlawful disposition of state property was

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
See id.
See id.
335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983).
Burk, 770 P.2d at 29 (quoting Brockmeyer, 335 N.W.2d at 841).
784 P.2d 1053 (Okla. 1989).
See id. at 1054.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1055.
See id.
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sufficient to invoke public policy.' However, with regard to the second incident,
the court reasoned that.Vannerson's claim was insufficient because he could not "tie
his allegation to any specific constitutional, statutory, or decisional wrong by the
University which he sought to correct by his actions."' The court found that the
only policy implicated by Vannerson was the University policy requiring accuracy
of custodial departmental records.' This policy, the court stated, failed "to rise to
the level of a constitutional, statutory, or decisional statement of public policy of the
State of Oklahoma."' Furthermore, the court cited Vannerson's failure to offer any
evidence of unsafe, immoral, or unlawful activity on the part of the University and
that his employment was conditioned on his participation in such activities."
Vannerson's only allegation was that he was dissatisfied with his supervisor's
investigation of the incidents and that the discrepancies in inventory were likely the
result of accounting errors. 2 The court held that these allegations were insufficient
to invoke public plicy and, thus, support a cause of action for wrongful discharge.33
11. Hayes v. Eateries,Inc.
A. Statement of the Case'
John Hayes was an assistant manager at Garfield's restaurant in Stillwater,
Oklahoma. On May 29, 1990, Hayes was discharged without reason from this
position. Prior to his termination, Hayes had discovered that his immediate
supervisor, the manager of the restaurant, was embezzling from Garfield's." Hayes
claimed that the reason he was terminated was because he confronted his manager
with these allegations and threatened to continue to investigate the embezzlement
and report it to law enforcement officials.'
Based on these events, Hayes alleged two causes of action. First, Hayes claimed
that his discharge constituted a breach of an employment contract based on oral

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See
Id.
See
Id.
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.

33. See id. At the original trial, the jury found for Vannerson. The Vannerson court reversed the
decision and remanded the case for a new trial. See id. The court stated that, although competent
evidence existed on which the jury could have based its verdict, evidence of incident number two was
improperly submitted to the jury. See id. Reversal is warranted if it is impossible to separate the
plaintiffs possible recovery on properly submitted facts from the possibility that the plaintiff recovered
on facts improperly submitted to the jury. See id. at 1055-56.
34. Because the issue before the Oklahoma Supreme Court was the appropriateness of the trial
court's decision to dismiss Hayes's complaint, the entire factual record is confined to the limited factual
allegations of Hayes's p-tition.
35. See Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., 905 P.2d 778, 780 (Okla. 1995).
36. See id. The record on who Hayes actually reported the embezzlement to is unclear. However,
for purposes of the opinion, the court assumed that Hayes reported the violations to someone inside the
corporation and to law enforcement officials.
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assurances that he would be employed as long as he performed his job satisfactorily." Second, Hayes claimed that his discharge violated public policy."
Therefore, he could state a cause of action under the guidelines set forth in Burk.
After the trial court granted Eateries, Inc.'s motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, Hayes appealed. The Court of Appeals
affirmed.39 The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted Hayes's writ of certiorari.'
The issue before the Oklahoma Supreme Court was whether Hayes's discharge
for reporting, either internally to company officials or externally to law enforcement
officials, of embezzlement by a co-employee was sufficient to state a cause of
action under the public policy exception to employment-at-wil 4 as set forth in
Burk v. K-Mart Corp.4 The Hayes court held that an employee's reporting, either
internally or externally, of embezzlement by a co-employee was insufficient to
support a wrongful discharge cause of action and affirmed the trial court's
dismissal4
B. The Hayes Opinion
The essential thrust of the Hayes court's reasoning is that no clear and compelling
public policy was invoked by Hayes The court began by noting that, while an
employee's reporting of crimes committed by a co-employee against the interests of
the employer to outside law enforcement officials and/or to corporate management
is to be "lauded and encouraged,"45' the crime of embezzlement is not "so imbued
with a clear and compelling public policy such that a tort claim is stated if the
employer discharges the employee for so reporting."'
The court's initial analysis focused on the external reporting of embezzlement to
law enforcement officials. The court's analysis distinguished between three possible
interests an employee could be protecting by reporting a crime. First are those
instances in which an employee seeks to exercise a right of his own. In those cases,
an employee can maintain a cause of action under the public policy exception to
employment-at-will if he is discharged while exercising those rights4 Examples
include an employee terminated for failing to drop a lawsuit against a third party
resulting from an on-the-job injury or when an employee is terminated for filing a
workers' compensation claim." However, these examples are distinguishable from

37. See id. The court also dismissed this claim as inadequate to support a cause of action. However,
the scope of this note is limited to the court's discussion regarding Hayes wrongful discharge claim. For
more information regarding the court's discussion of Hayes's contract-based claim, see id. at 782-84.
38. See id. at 781.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 780.
42. 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989).
43. See Hayes, 905 P.2d at 780.
44. See id. at 786.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
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the facts alleged by Hayes because the only rights Hayes sought to vindicate where
those of his employer and not his own.49
The second class of interests which might be protected by the reporting of a
crime are the interests of the public. Again, the court notes, an employee who
reports a crime that is against the interests of his emnployer is not "seeking to
vindicate a public wrong where the victim of the crime could in any real sense be
said to be the general public, as where crimes or violations of health or safety laws
are involved."' The facts in Hayes are distinguishable, the court argued, from
cases in other jurisdictions in which an employee was protected after reporting
infractions of the "rules, regulation, or law pertaining to the public health, safety or
general welfare.'' Such cases include when an employee reports his employer's
Medicaid fraud,52 complains to management of defective brake installations in
automobiles,53 reports internally that his company is not adhering to state licensing
and labeling laws,. or attempts to persuade management to conform to consumer
credit and protection laws.5 In those cases, the interest the employee sought to
protect was public. Hn order to support a claim under the public policy exception
to employment-at-will, "the public policy must truly be public, rather than merely
private or proprietary. ' Thus, the court added, Hayes could not support a cause
of action because the only interest he sought to protect was the third type of
interest, the private or proprietary interest of the employer.'
Furthermore, the court stated that the decision to report embezzling by an
employee rests with the employer who was the direct victim of the crime." The
court, while acknowledging that, generally, the public is the victim of all crimes,
reasoned that there existed no:
general consensus sufficient to base a Burk tort claim upon that there
is a public policy so thoroughly established in the public consciousness
that would forbid an employer from making an informed business
decision that its employees are prohibited from reporting crimes against
the interest of the employer (here embezzlement from Garfield's) to law
enforcement officials and if they do so termination is the result. After
all it is the employer, Garfield's, whose money or property was stolen,
not Hayes' money or the money of a relative or friend."

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See id.
lId
Id.
See Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685, 689 (Kan. 1988).
See White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 669, 671 (10th Cir. 1990).
See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 388 (Conn. 1980).
See Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 272 (W. Va. 1978).
Hayes v. Eaterie;, Inc., 905 P.2d 778, 786 (Okla. 1995).
See id.
See id. at 787.
Id.
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Thus, when the employer is the victim of the crime and the only interest affected
by the crime is the private or proprietary interest of the employer, an employee who
reports such a crime cannot support a claim under the public policy exception to
employment-at-will.
Through this framework, the court was able to distinguish Hayes's allegations
from the facts of Vannerson. Although the plaintiff in Vannerson did not seek to
protect an interest of his own and the infraction of Vannerson's co-employee
involved an illegal disposition of the employer's property, the key distinction lies
in the nature of the property. Because the property belonged a public institution, the
University of Oklahoma, it was public property.' By reporting the illegal
disposition of such property, Vannerson was protecting the public interest in seeing
to it that tax dollars were not misappropriated.6 In Hayes, no such overriding
public interest was present. The only interest implicated was the private interest of
the employer in deciding whether or not to pursue criminal action against an
embezzling employee. This, according to the court, is a "private business decision"
and is beyond the scope of judicial review. 2
IV. Analysis of Hayes
The court's reasoning in Hayes is interesting in three respects. First, the definition
of what constitutes public policy varies from the definition used by the other
jurisdictions cited to in the Hayes opinion.' Second, the Hayes decision essentially
causes a stratification between those crimes which the court perceives to be serious
enough to warrant protection if reported and crimes that are not "public" in nature.
Third, the public-private dichotomy drawn by the Hayes court is distinct from the
way in which other jurisdictions, including those cited approvingly by the Hayes
court, have separated the two interests.
A. The Hayes Determinationof Public Policy
Many other jurisdictions have determined that public policy encourages the
reporting of all crimes. An excellent example of this is Palmateerv. International
Harvester Co.' In Palmateer,the Illinois Court of Appeals expressed the idea that
public policy encourages citizens to report crimes.' The Palmateer court stated,
"[t]here is no public policy more basic, nothing more implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty than the enforcement of a State's criminal code. There is no public
policy more important or more fundamental than the one favoring the effective

60. See id at 787-88
61. See id.
62. Id at 788.
63. See infra Part IV.A.
64. 421 N.E.2d 876 (I1l. 1981). Incidentally, the Oklahoma Supreme Court cited approvingly to the
reasoning of Palmateerin the Burk decision when Oklahoma first adopted the public policy exception
to employment-at-will. See Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 28 (Okla. 1989).
65. See Palmateer,421 N.E.2d at 880.
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protection of the lives and property of citizens."' Furthermore, because the
enforcement of a State's criminal code is important to the public's welfare, public
policy encourages citizens to report crimes,67 even in the absence of constitutional
or statutory provisions requiring affirmative action on the part of the citizen to do
SO.
Other jurisdictions have echoed the sentiments of the Palmateercourt, including
jurisdictions cited approvingly by the Hayes court. One example is Palmer v.
Brown.' The Hayes court cites Palmer as a case in which an employee reported
a violation of the law sufficiently pertaining to the health, safety, and welfare of the
public to support a wrongful discharge claim." In Palmer,the plaintiff claimed she
was discharged after she reported Medicaid fraud by her employer externally to law
enforcement officials.0 The Kansas Supreme Court held that this allegation was
sufficient to support a cause of action for wrongful discharge.7' The Palmer court
stated that citizens have a civil duty to report crimes or infractions pertaining to the
public health, safety, or general welfare.' Citizens who exercise this duty should
be protected from reprisal.' However, while the Hayes court distinguished between
those crimes which affect the general public and those which affect only private
interests, the Palmer court makes no such distinction. The Palmer court reasoned
that "[lit
has long been recognized as public policy to encourage citizens to report
crimes."'74
Thus, the Hayes court's determination that the reporting of embezzlement is
outside the scope of activity encouraged by public policy is out of step with other
jurisdictions' concepts of public policy. While other jurisdictions adhere to the view
that an employee who reports crimes committed by his employer or co-employees
is advancing a clear, compelling, and fundamental interest, the Hayes court adopts
the view that public policy is advanced only by the reportingof those particular
crimes in which the general public is the victim, and nit when the victim is a
private entity.
B. The Hayes Decision Stratifies Certain Crimes
The Hayes decision distinguishes between those crimes which affect the public
and those which affect only private interests and determines that an employee is
only protected from discharge when he or she reports those crimes which affect the
general public. While the court acknowledges that all crimes are generally crimes
against the public, some crimes, such as embezzlement, are not so thoroughly
established in the public consciousness to be classified as crimes against the

66. Id. at 879.

67. See id at 880.
68.
69.
70.
71.

752 P.2d 685 (Kan. 1988).
See Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., 905 P.2d 778, 786 (Okla. 1995).
See Palmer,752 P.2d at 686.
See id. at 687.

72. See id at 689.
73. See id.
74. Id.
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public." By classifying crimes in this manner, the Hayes court uses some abstract
barometer of public opinion to determine which crimes are crimes against the
public. However, a more reliable barometer is available to make this determination:
the legislature.
By criminalizing embezzlement, the legislature made the decision that embezzlement would be handled by the State's criminal justice system as a crime against
the State.76 While some crimes certainly have a greater impact than embezzlement
on the public consciousness, the legislature has determined that, at least on some
level, embezzlement affects a public interest. Again, Palmateerprovides assistance.
In Palmateer,the crime reported by the discharged employee could have amounted
to as little as the theft of a two-dollar screwdriver.' However, the Palmateercourt
reasoned that:
[t]he magnitude of the crime is not the issue here. It was the General
Assembly, the People's representatives, who decided that the theft of a
$2 screwdriver was a problem that should be resolved by resort to the
criminal justice system. 11's business judgment, no matter how sound,
cannot override that decision.7
Rather than look to the legislature, the Hayes court instead determines whether
the crime is one which is ingrained in the consciousness of the public at large.
Reporting of those crimes which do rise to that level is protected. This raises at
least two questions. First, what happens if the public consciousness concerning a
particular crime changes? Will the reporting of that crime then be protected?
Second, are judges really in the best position to determine what crimes are deeply
embedded in the public psyche? Judges are not responsible to the general public as
legislators are. When the decision as to what constitutes public policy is raised, the
judiciary should defer to that body which is closest to the people and arguably has
a better understanding of the mood of the public. When the legislature has decided
that a certain activity offends the public interest by criminalizing it, the court should
use this more reliable legislative pronouncement as a guide to determine what
constitutes public policy.
C. The Public/PrivateInterest Distinction
In adopting the distinction between public and private or proprietary interests, the
Hayes court follows the lead of other jurisdictions. The Hayes court cites Wagner

75. See Hayes, 905 P.2d at 787.
76. See, e.g., Belline v. K-Mart Corp., 940 F.2d 184, 186-87 (7th Cir. 1991) ("A society's
fundamental concern for the lives and property of its citizens is embodied in the criminal code.")
77. See Palmateer,421 N.E.2d at 880.
78. lId
79. See Hayes, 905 P.2d at 787. ("[We are not aware... that there is a public policy so thoroughly

established in the public consciousness that would forbid an employer from making an informed business
decision that its employees are prohibited from reporting crimes against the interest of the employer...
to law enforcement officials and if they do so termination is the result.").
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v. City of Globe' as standing for the proposition that only the reporting of crimes
which affect the public interest are t6 be protected and those which involve a private
or proprietary interest are not." While the Hayes court focuses on the nature of the
interest protected by the criminal statute, the Wagner court instead emphasizes the
interest the employee seeks to promote.' The key inquiry is whether the employee
seeks to further the public good or his own private or proprietary interest." The
Wagner court states, "[s]o long as employees' actions are not merely private or
proprietary, but instead seek to further the public good, the decision to expose
illegal or unsafe practices should be encouraged."" The Wagner court seems to
suggest that the nature of the employees' motives are the key factor and not the
nature of the interest protected under the criminal code. Further, the Wagner court
concludes that any actions which promote enforcement of the State's laws provides
a benefit to the public.' Through this framework, it matters not which crime has
been committed, only that some crime has been committed and that the employee
was discharged for reporting it. "The relevant inquiry is not limited to whether any
particular law or regulation has been violated, although that may be important, but
instead emphasizes whether some 'important public policy interest embodied in the
law' has been furthered by the whistleblowing activity.'"
Other cases cited by Hayes also adopt a public/private interest distinction based
not on the interest protected by the statute but on the interest the whistleblower
seeks to protect. In Palmer v. Brown," the court distinguished between those
employees who report crimes to further a public purpose and those who report
crimes for a personal reason.' The court concluded that only whistleblowing done
in the promotion of a public interest is protected." The report must have been
made out of a good faith concern for the public and not for malice or other personal
reasons.' Again, as the court did in Wagner, the Palmer court examines whether
the interest the whistleblower seeks to promote is public or private, not whether the
interest protected under the criminal statute is public or private.
The California Supreme Court adopted a third, somewhat different, approach to
the public/private distinction in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp." The
public/private distinction in Foley hinged on to whom the employee reported the
alleged criminal wrongdoing.' When an employee is discharged after reporting

80. 722 P.2d 250 (Adz. 1986).
81. See Hayes, 905 P.2d at 786-87.
82. See Wagner, 722 P.2d at 257.
83. See id.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. 752 P.2d 685 (Kan. 1988).
88. See id at 686.
89. See id. at 690.
90. See id. at 690.
91. 765 P.2d 373 (Cad. 1988).
92. See id. at 380. But cf. Belline v. Kmart Corp., 940 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1991) (employee reporting
suspected criminal wrong-doing internally to supervisor protected from discharge for so doing).
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suspected infractions only to his employer, and the report serves only the private
interest of the employer, the employee cannot assert a public policy cause of
action." In Foley, the plaintiff was discharged after he reported that his new
supervisor was under investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for
suspected embezzlement at his prior job.' The Foley court reasoned that no public
policy was implicated in this case.9" Foley's disclosure only protected the private
interest the employer had in retaining a possible embezzler as an employee.' The
Foley court stated that when the employee's report affects only the private interest
of the employer, no public policy cause of action is cognizable.'
While Foley is distinguishable factually from Hayes in that Foley reported that
his supervisor was under investigation for past embezzlement while Hayes reported
current embezzlement by his supervisor, Foley is helpful in illustrating the different
approaches taken by the courts in the public/private analysis. While some, such as
Palmer and Wagner, focus on the motivation of the employee and the interest he
or she seeks to protect, the court in Foley focuses on who the employee chooses to
report the infraction to.
V. The Ramifications of Hayes
While Hayes answered the question of whether an employee can maintain a cause
of action when he or she is discharged for reporting the crime of embezzlement by
a co-employee, the opinion left many questions unanswered. Among the primary
uncertainties left by the Hayes opinion concerns which crimes an employee can
report and be protected from discharge.
The Hayes opinion provides some clues but fails to provide definitive guidelines.
Hayes teaches that a cause of action is available when a "clear and compelling
public policy" is involved. 9 However, who determines when a policy is clear and
compelling? In Hayes, the court made this decision based on the idea that no
general consensus existed in the public mind that the crime of embezzlement
adversely affected the public welfare. 9 However, is the judiciary equipped to make
this determination?
A few hypotheticals demonstrate the difficulty in determining when a crime
affects a public interest or the private interest of the employer. What interest is
affected when an employee reports his employer's failure to pay state income taxes?
The interest could be seen as public because the state is denied the benefit of that
employer's tax contribution. However, viewed through the framework of Hayes, one
could also argue that an employer's decision to pay or withhold income taxes is a

93. See Foley, 765 P.2d at 379.
94. See id. at 375. Interestingly, after Foley was discharged, his supervisor plead guilty to a count

of embezzlement. See id.
95. See id. at 380.
96. See id. at 379-80.
97. See id. at 380.

98. See Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., 905 P.2d 778, 786 (Okla. 1995).
99. See it at 787.
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"private business decision." Furthermore, the employer's private and proprietary
interests, i.e., the employer's own money, are the only interests directly affected by
the employee's reporting the infraction because the employer loses the money
involved. Is this interest at stake here public or private?
Additionally, while it is clear that an employee who reports embezzlement by a
co-employee is not protected from discharge, what about an employee who reports
a burglary committed by co-employee against the employer? Is burglary different
from embezzlement because the crime involves a breaking and entering? Are
different interests implicated because the employee does not commit the crime as
an "insider" who illegally appropriates the employer's property? Would the result
be any different if the burglary was committed by a relative of the employer? In
that case, would the employer still be justified for firing an employee who reported
the burglary and its perpetrator?
This state of affairs leaves employees without sufficient guidelines to determine
when they can report crimes and be protected from discharge. This could leave an
employee in the prickly predicament of being forced to choose between reporting
a crime and keeping his or her job."m This could have serious implications for the
criminal justice system. First, it might discourage employees from reporting crimes.
If an employee faces the grim prospect of being terminated for performing a civic
duty, economic realities might force the employee to overlook the crime. Rather
than force employees into this state of limbo, our courts should encourage those
employees who promote the aims of the criminal justice system by reporting
suspected criminal wrongdoing.
The Hayes decision also undermines the legislative intent in passing a criminal
statute. The legislature felt embezzlement represented an activity the State had an
interest in preventing. It seems unreasonable that the legislature would pass a statute
but not desire the citizens to follow or enforce such a statute. However, by allowing
employers to discharge employees who exercise a civic duty to report certain
crimes, but allowing protection for the reporting of other crimes, the Hayes decision
leaves employees in an uncertain state of affairs.
VI. Suggestionsfor Reform in the Wake of Hayes
As the forgoing discussion reveals, the primary problem with the public policy
cause of action lies in the definition of what constitutes public policy. At best,
courts across the country have been inconsistent and incoherent when making this
determination. Some courts recognize sources of public policy as diverse as
professional codes of ethics and responsibility"0 ' and state common law, while
other courts limit the public policy causes of action to only those instances when
the legislature has specifically prohibited the employer from discharging the
employee."° The inability of the courts to come to a uniform and reliable
100. See Belline v. Kmart Corp., 940 F.2d 184, 187 (7th Cir. 1991) ("But the risk of discharge may
deter employees who reasonably believe that crimes have been committed from acting on the
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definition of public policy has led at least one commentator to call for an abolition
of both the public policy exception and the employment-at-will doctrine and replace
them with a singular "just cause" termination standard. 3 However, other
alternatives exist which do not require a dismantling of the current employment law
structure.
First, the courts could allow a discharged employee to maintain an actionable tort
under the public policy exception any time the employee reports any crime
externally to law enforcement officials. The effects of this would eliminate the two
policy problems presented by the Hayes decision. First, it would clear up the
confusion about which crimes an employee could report. Because the reporting of
any and all crimes would be protected, employees would not be forced to ignore
criminal acts or face the prospect of termination for acting to enforce the criminal
code. Second, allowing protection under the public policy exception would promote
the enforcement of the criminal code. Employees could report crimes without fear
of reprisal from their employers. Consequently, more crimes might be reported and
the aims of the criminal justice system would be furthered.
Regarding those instances when an employee reports infractions internally to
corporate management, the court could take two approaches. First, the court could
afford the same protection to internal reporting as it would to external reporting by
allowing an actionable tort when an employee reports the violation of any crime to
internal management. This is the approach taken by the Illinois courts in the postPalmateer era. In Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp.,'04 the court held that an
employee's discharge due to a complaint to the President and Chief Operating
Officer of suspected embezzlement was sufficient to establish a cause of action for
retaliatory discharge in contravention of public policy."m° In Petrik, the court
rejected Monarch's argument that, because Petrik did not report the suspected
embezzlement to outside authorities, the case involved only a private internal
dispute."6 The court reasoned that, because the Illinois Criminal Code was
implicated, public policy was thus involved and the situation involved "something
more than an ordinary dispute between an employee and his employer."'"m
The second alternative would be to distinguish between the internal and external
reporting of crimes. While external reporting of any crime seems to affect public
policies as articulated by the legislature, internal reporting of crimes to management
could be handled as a private business matter to be left to the discretion of the
company. While this would afford the employer some latitude when making the
decision to terminate an employee, it would still allow the employee a modicum of
protection if he or she chooses to report the crime to law enforcement officials. The
interests of the employer, the employee, and the public would be served to some

change to employment-at-will doctrine is best left to the legislature).
103. See Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy
Exception, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1931, 1950 (1983).
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degree. The employer is still allowed to terminate at-will if he desires. The
employee is still afforded some protection if he chooses to report the crime to
appropriate law enforcement officials. And the public benefits from the enforcement
of its criminal code,
Another possible solution would be for the legislature to pass a statute preventing
employers from discharging employees who report crimes to law enforcement
officials. This has teen done in other jurisdictions. One example is the California
statute which protects employees who, in good faith, report suspected criminal
wrongdoing."° The statute reads, in relevant part:
(a) No employer shall make, adopt, or enforce any rule, regulation, or
policy preventing an employee from disclosing information to a
government or law enforcement agency, where the employee has
reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of
state or federal statute, or violation or noncompliance with a state or
federal regulation."°
The Oklahoma legislature has already granted this protection to employees of
State agencies. The statute provides:
As used in this act: "agency" means any office, department, board,
commission or institution of the executive branch of state
government ....
No officer or employee of any state agency shall
prohibit or take disciplinary action against employees of such agency,
whether subject to the provisions of the Merit System or in unclassified service, for: ... 2. Reporting any violation of state or federal
law, rule or policy; mismanagement; a gross waste of public funds; an
abuse of authority; or a substantial and specific danger to public
health or safety."'
While the legislature has not yet extended this protection to employees in the private
sector, it may want to in light of Hayes. To extend this protection would not only
clear up some of the confusion surrounding Hayes but would advance a compelling
State interest in seeing that its criminal statutes are enforced.
Ideally, the legislature would step in where the courts have failed and provide
protection to those employees who, in good faith, report suspected criminal
violations. This would eliminate the problems caused by judicial zig-zagging.
However, the next best solution would be for the courts to provide a definition
of public policy that is consistent and easily applicable. Clear guidelines are
necessary to protect both the interest of the employee in maintaining employment
stability and the interest of the employer in knowing when he can terminate an
employee and at the same time avoid tort liability. These clear guidelines are
available in the State's criminal statutes. Using these as a benchmark, employers and
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employees could both determine what activities were acceptable. Furthermore,
Oklahoma courts could then avoid the predicament of trying to determine when a
crime is public or private.
Furthermore, the internal/external reporting distinction should be avoided. As the
Petrick court noted, a State's criminal statutes do not become less public merely
because violations are reported to corporate management rather than law enforcement officials."' Additionally, as one commentator noted, courts and employers
should encourage employees to remedy wrongs through the corporate structure
rather than going outside the company."' By allowing an actionable tort when an
employee reports suspected criminal activity to his employer, Oklahoma courts
could accomplish this end.
VIL Conclusion
The analytical framework established by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Hayes
is problematic for several reasons. First, the court's definition of public policy
ignores the fact that the Oklahoma legislature has criminalized embezzlement and
made a determination that this activity is contrary to the public interest. Second, the
public/private distinction drawn by the Hayes court rejects the notion that reporting
a crime to law enforcement officials necessarily involves the public. Third, the
practical effect of Hayes is that it could have a chilling effect on employees who
may or may not now decide to report crimes because of they fear losing their job.
The ramifications of this are that criminal activity may go unreported and
unpunished. Although embezzlement is not "thoroughly established in the public
consciousness,""' other crimes which are may go unreported because an employee
cherishes his job more than he cherishes enforcement of Oklahoma's criminal
statutes. Employees should not be forced to make this choice.
M. Derek Zolner
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